Newsletter of
THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT

March 1973 — Edited by MICHAEL HARRINGTON

The New Shape of Our Politics

History is turning a corner—so too must the Left.

America's unconscionable intervention in Vietnam seems to be ending. The focus of leftwing activities for the past seven years may thereby disappear soon. Unless there are new departures, some will begin to think nostalgically of the days when evil was simply defined by a soldier's cigarette lighter igniting a peasant's hut.

The Cold War is tapering off. In recent months, the United States rescued the Soviet Union from the economic —and political—crisis of a severe grain shortage; the Russians and the Chinese worked hard for the reelection of Richard Nixon; and the Russians, Poles and East Germans helped Willy Brandt in his victorious campaign. At the same time, old-fashioned contradictions appear within the world market.

In the United States conservatism has, for the first time this century, become intelligent. So there are new complexities. Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, for instance, was a shamefaced but unmistakably radical innovation — a guaranteed annual income—presented in the context of an ignorant, vindictive Presidential attack on welfare recipients. The 1973 Budget provides a Keynesian, full-employment rationale for a reactionary attack on social programs. It is therefore necessary to educate people in the subtleties of Nixon's demagoguery. Nixon's seeming defense of the average taxpayer against the profligate designs of spendthrift social engineers has to be unmasked as a justification for maintaining tens of billions of tax subsidies for the rich at the expense of the poor and the aging.

We no longer have Herbert Hoover to kick around. The new reaction comes on as a conservative version of the old liberalism.

Liberalism itself is in transition. Important ideologists announce their "deradicalization." Writers in *The Public Interest* and *Commentary* argue, with a depth and intricacy of error which the *National Review* could never achieve, that equality, democratic planning and rational social change are dubious goals.

On the other wing, many trade unionists and middle-class liberals have become aware of the need for structural change in our society. In the McGovern campaign, for instance, the frankly redistributionist principle that revenue should be raised by levies on unearned income was a major step forward.

On the campus there is a decline of activism, a revival of private concerns. The New Left is dead. But a large and serious constituency of the Left remains, even if unorganized and uncertain. If presented with a clear and reasoned perspective for basic change, it might be won to a life-time commitment, even in the Nixon years; if not, it could vanish.

Even as the President proclaims the Keynesian transfiguration of Horatio Alger, the Left must begin anew. The immediate tasks are obvious enough: to build a progressive majority for the Democratic Party in 1974 and 1976 as a first step toward the transformation of the nation. But there are also deeper, more difficult questions in this period which begins on the far side of Vietnam, the Cold War and Republican orthodoxy.

There are adults who can contribute to the task of rebuilding the American left: some, veterans perhaps, of the New Left, others, long-time partisans of the democratic Left; trade unionists who fought for McGovern last fall, and trade unionists whom Richard Nixon is now teaching that they should have fought for McGovern last fall. There is that mass constituency of the youth on campus which needs political content for its idealism.

The Left, more than ever before, needs thought, self-criticism, candor and communication. We hope this *Newsletter* will make a modest contribution to that end.

Peace in Vietnam: The Struggle Continues

What can one say with any assurance about the future of Vietnam? Only that the expectation of a final end to bloodshed is wildly optimistic. For a few months, probably, the ceasefire will survive. Both sides will jockey for better positions; the truce arrangements will prove cumbersome and their ambiguities will be revealed; the difficulties of marking out precise boundaries between government and guerrillas will lead to "incidents," and these may explode as local fighting, assassinations, etc. That an election will ever be held in South Vietnam is doubtful; that it could echo the people's desires (assuming the majority to have any desires by now other than to be left in peace) is still more doubtful.

Jack Anderson reports that "the secret estimate of the Joint Chiefs [of the U.S. armed forces] is that the ceasefire will break down and the Communists will ultimately gain control of all Vietnam." It seems a realistic prognosis. If so, adds Anderson, "nine years of American dying will have been in vain."

The likely domestic repercussions? Can we now say that Vietnam is no longer a political issue and the divided ranks

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Inside the Unions: Courts Aid the Rebels

In New York, two reform-minded unionists are fighting difficult battles for union democracy. Frank Schonfeld, Secretary Treasurer of New York District Council 9 of the Painters union, won an important victory in his fight to bring democracy and fair trade practices to his District, when Judge J. Brieant of the New York Federal District Court granted him an injunction barring execution of union sanctions against him.

Schonfeld, Secretary Treasurer of District 9 since 1967, has been unable to establish a reform administration because of opposition from some local leaders. On September 15, 1972, Schonfeld's opposition, seeking to end his power, brought Schonfeld before a District Trial Board, on the charge of giving away painters' jurisdiction over taping work. The Board, backed by the Painters International, found Schonfeld guilty, stripped him of his post, and barred his candidacy in the 1973 election.

Judge Brieant's decision denied the District Trial Board's jurisdiction in the case, challenged its impartiality, and predicted that its charges would be found spurious. As a result of the injunction, Schonfeld is now free to seek re-election in June, 1973.

Meanwhile, Jim Morrissey, an insurgent leader of the National Maritime Union, faces a bitter election fight in his campaign for International President. He won a small, but significant victory in Federal District Court, when a Federal judge ruled recently that Morrissey's appeal for Court protection of his campaign rights deserved a hearing. Morrissey is seeking access to the union's newspaper, the *Pilot*, to present his reform platform. The Union had sought summary dismissal of Morrissey's appeal, on the grounds that a union's election procedure can only be challenged after the election has taken place.

Morrissey, seeking election in April, 1973, received a majority of the votes of active sailors in the 1971 election, but lost the total vote. Two years ago, he was beaten almost to death in an incident believed by many to be related to his insurgent activity.

Walking the Picket Line

The Farm Workers' Lettuce strike and boycott continues. With Teamster opposition acting as a new handicap, the boycott has made slow progress since the heady days of the Democratic National Convention.

The UFW asks consumers not to shop at A&P, the largest buyer of non-UFW iceberg lettuce. In New York, the A&P management has refused even to meet with union representatives.

Farm worker supporters can help out in four ways:

1. Picket A&P stores on Fridays and Saturdays, when most people shop. To join a picket line, call the UFW office in your city.
2. Write to Tom Noonan, A&P vice president. His address is 420 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. Ask him to have A&P buy only Farmworker lettuce.
3. Organize meetings and letter campaigns in your union, church, synagogue, school, or office.
4. Collect clothing for UFW strikers in the D'Arrigo lettuce fields in California.

With negotiations coming up with the grape growers in the Spring, and with organizing drives underway among sugar growers, the Union urgently needs a victory in the lettuce fields.

Meanwhile, more than 3,000 Farah strikers are living on $30-a-week strike benefits as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' boycott continues. The boycott was bolstered December 11, when ACWA members throughout the country left their jobs to lead Christmas season picketing against stores still selling Farah slacks. Although the strike-boycott has already cost the company more than $10 million. Farah management appears adamant about maintaining a non-union shop.

The success of the Farah boycott now seems to depend largely on what happens in smaller cities, in the West and Midwest, where the liberal-labor communities are weak. To find out how you can help the Boycott, write the ACWA Union Label Department, 15 Union Square, New York, N. Y.

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Which Road to Defeat?

Speaking at a plenary session of the Issues Convention of the New Democratic Coalition on February 3, panelists Bella Abzug, Norman Podhoretz and Gloria Steinem blamed each other for the triumph of Nixon, the budget cuts, and the general disrepair of Western Civilization. Their proposals for reorganizing a progressive majority came into head-on collision.

Congresswoman Abzug called on issue-oriented liberals to assume leadership of America's workers and ethnics, which seems promising, until you think of the disorganization of New York's West Side reform clubs. Mr. Podhoretz called for a fight against "the New Politics movement" (whatever he means by that) within the Democratic Party, apparently hoping its membership would multiply by dividing. Ms Steinem's solution was the most surprising: She said there was no problem at all, since 1972 was a great victory for liberals, who merely needed to continue the same strategy in order to win more such great victories.

It was the fourth panelist, Howard Samuel, vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and Executive Director of Labor for McGovern, who contributed a little sense. Samuel argued that, despite its faults, the labor movement would maintain a liberal stance in electoral politics, because its members could not afford more great victories like 1972—their food bills were going up and their contracts suffered under a Nixon Presidency.

Is "Apathy" the Word on Campus?

by David Bensman

Has "apathy" brought an end to student participation in the Democratic Party? Conventional wisdom now holds that youth support for McGovern died after his convention victory, especially because of the Eagleton affair. Pundits cite the low vote turnout (the Bureau of the Census estimates that less than half the newly enfranchised young voters actually voted on November 7th); they cite the majority support Nixon won from young voters and the cool political atmosphere on the campuses prior to the election.

All of these things are true. 1972 was not a high water mark of youth politics; certainly the crusading spirit of the Gene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy campaigns of 1968 and of the McGovern primary campaigns was absent. But the conventional wisdom forgets that the general election is an event occurring simultaneously in 50 states, whereas primaries come up one by one. In fact, *there were probably more students working full time in the fall for McGovern than during the primaries* (less visible because more scattered).

The point is this: young people, especially students, have become a permanent fixture on the political scene, for better or worse. They will not fade away. Though campuses may seem apathetic or conservative, there will continue to be a large group of students eager to bring reform through work in the Democratic Party.

Look back to 1968. It did not then appear that youth electoral activity would necessarily be a permanent feature of politics. What has since changed is the opening up of the Democratic Party, secured through the McGovern-Hughes reform rules and symbolized by the Miami Convention. The reforms mandated party leaders to seek out youth leaders to be delegates, made it possible for young people to fight for representation, and gave young activists a heady taste of power. Healthy, if also potentially dangerous, currents of ambition and opportunism are going through college campuses, mixing with the idealism noticeable among young activists since the mid-1960s. This insures the presence of campus activists with a stake in the electoral mobilization of the student community.

At Columbia University, where anti-war demonstrations have mobilized far more students than electoral campaigns, this fall saw the birth of a strong McGovern-for-President organization; 50 activists were able to raise funds for a storefront and to mobilize several hundred volunteers for the campaign. After the discouraging results came in, the group decided to maintain itself as an electoral-oriented organization, involved in local Democratic politics and in issues ranging from rent control to anti-war protest. Most group members joined the local Democratic reform club, and one is running for club president. Already, three aspiring Mayoral candidates and one contender for Manhattan District Attorney have sought out support from the Columbia group.

Similar events have transpired at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York. During the fall, scores of students worked for Democratic candidates in staunchly Republican Suffolk County. After the election, an embryonic organization emerged, the "Student Community Action Committee," with support from local Democrats, Stony Brook faculty, and students. Among the goals of the organization are the expansion of black-white dialogue on campus; agitation for the right of students to vote from their dormitory residences; reform of the local voting system; and support of the Farm Workers' Lettuce Boycott and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Boycott of Farah clothing. Because of the weakness of the Suffolk County Democratic Party, the student group has not yet tried to establish a formal relationship with it.

Not all campuses are oriented to electoral activity to such an extent. Response to new opportunities for participation requires leadership and political skill, by no means present everywhere. Even when campus activists take advantage of their new opportunities, their impact will not be uniformly progressive. Where students succumb to elitist tendencies and dismiss all those with whom they disagree as enemies, campus electoral activity can have negative results. Specifically, student disdain for working class neighbors and their culture could lead to a split in Democratic ranks and conservative victory (e.g., Ronald Reagan, James Buckley).

But there are some positive signs. The McGovern campaign seemed to give student activists a sense of responsibility for the political consequences of their actions, and made them more tolerant of potential allies. The ability of McGovern youngsters to effect a limited alliance with the Daley organization in Chicago is a potent example of this tendency. The 1968-vintage student disdain for workers seems to be waning. Many campus activists are surprisingly alive to the potential for political alliances, as evidenced by support of the Farm Workers, campus union organizing drives and community-wide tenant organizing projects. The prospect of a loosely organized but nevertheless powerful student force for democratic political change appears to be a bit brighter than one had a right to expect only three or four years ago.

French Socialists Hit U.S.S.R.

After several years of muting their distaste for the Soviet Union while they sought an alliance with the Communists at home, the French Socialists launched a vigorous campaign criticizing the Soviet Union soon after the signing of last May's electoral agreement with the French Communists. Socialist Party leader Francois Mitterand condemned Soviet anti-Semitism in strong terms, and anti-Communist barbs reappeared in the Socialist press. A weekend conference on the Czechoslovak Spring, attended by the entire Socialist leadership, highlighted this campaign. The French Communists, among the more slavish followers of the Moscow line in the West, have been conspicuously silent about all of this.

Meanwhile, as the polls continued to show the Left alliance leading the governing Gaullists, President Pompidou flew to Russia where he was warmly greeted by Brezhnev, who (according to the *New York Times*) prefers continued Gaullist rule.

LIFE ON THE LEFT

Jimmy Higgins Reports . . .



WHAT'S BEHIND BEIRNE'S LEFT TURN? Not so very long ago, Joe Beirne, President of the half million member Communications Workers union, was fond of boasting about his toughness on foreign policy issues. "I'm not a hawk, I'm an eagle," Beirne reportedly told fellow trade unionists, "eagles eat hawks." Yet, after the Democratic Convention, this staunch Cold Warrior was among the first international union presidents to endorse McGovern. When Beirne became National Chairman of Labor for McGovern, some cynics suggested that he was acting as Meany's front man to put limits on the political insurgence in the AFL-CIO.

But Beirne's conduct since the election belies these suspicions. While some of the unionists in Labor for McGovern now say apologetically that the election results prove that Meany's "neutrality" policy was correct, Beirne has publicly blasted COPE and suggested that further steps toward "neutrality" in the future could mean the end of CWA support to COPE. When Peter Brennan was designated as Secretary of Labor, Meany and other AFL-CIO leaders offered congratulations, but Beirne wondered aloud whether a unionist could serve labor's interests in the anti-labor Nixon Administration. When American B-52's initiated the terror bombing over North Vietnam and most labor leaders remained silent, spokesmen for the Communications Workers blasted the Nixon war policy.

The consensus among Washington insiders is that Beirne is launching a discreet campaign to succeed Meany when the latter steps down. To win the Presidency, the theory goes, Beirne must assemble an anti-building trades coalition. He must reach out to unionists who, though perfectly loyal to Meany while he remains in office, are reluctant to elect another building tradesman or even a unionist seen as friendly to the building trades to the top job.

A LONG STANDING DIVISION within the American Federation of Teachers surfaced recently. At the December meeting of the AFT Executive Board, a vote was taken to determine whom the Teachers will send to represent them on the AFL-CIO Executive Council should an opening occur. By an 11-9 vote, the AFT Board decided that Albert Shanker, head of the largest local in the country, New York City's UFT, should represent the Teachers rather than AFT President, David Selden, an anti-war activist and a strong McGovern supporter. If and when the AFL-CIO invites a teacher to sit on its Executive Council, Shanker will be the first local president in American labor history to sit on the Federation's highest governing body.

A FULL SCALE DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACTION FIGHT seems one goal of the organizers of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. The self-proclaimed Cold War liberals are busy trying to form caucuses within the three Party Commissions and making plans to run delegate slates for the 1974 Party Conference. CDM's plans may be overly ambitious, though. Supposedly, a strongly labor-oriented organization, CDM's support from the AFL-CIO is unclear at best; few labor leaders have gone out of their way to identify themselves with CDM. Then, too, CDM's rhetoric is too close to Democrats for Nixon to suit many liberals who had strong reservations about the McGovern campaign. That association was strengthened in the minds of at least a few people when one of CDM's chief recruiters turned out to be a leader in Illinois Democrats for Nixon.

EUGENE McCARTHY MAY BE LONGING TO RETURN TO THE SENATE—but from his current home state of New York, rather than from his native Minnesota. Fund raising activities in New York City have already begun. But in seeking to challenge the Republican incumbent Sen. Jacob Javits, McCarthy may find himself on a collision course with some old friends and like-minded liberals. Mayor John Lindsay is definitely interested in the Democratic nomination, and former Congressman Allard Lowenstein, famous for his role in organizing the Dump Johnson effort, may also be interested in running for the Senate next year. Javits, meanwhile, looks like a tough man to beat, unless the White House decides to purge him by tacitly supporting a Conservative-Republican.

AS WE GO TO PRESS, the Steelworkers are holding national elections. Although the top leadership is unchallenged, an interesting contest is shaping up in the Chicago-Northwest Indiana, the United Steel Workers' largest district. With the retirement of Joseph Germano, long time District Director, Sam Evett, Germano's nominee, and Eddie Sadlowski, a young International staffer who has been active in the Chicago civil rights, anti-war and reform Democratic movements, are battling to succeed him. Evett has generally defended the record of the Germano administration while Sadlowski has called for new leadership to encourage rank and file participation in union affairs. More on this next issue.

Footnote—the Chicago-Indiana Frontlash, purportedly a group of young idealists interested in working with the labor movement on issues like voter registration, sponsored a testimonial dinner for Evett in the midst of the campaign.

The Left Wing of Realism

by Michael Harrington

To build a new American majority for social change, there must be a precise program, bold enough to respond to the challenges confronting our society, politically astute enough to appeal to millions of men and women. A program located on the left wing of realism!

At first glance, it might seem absurd to talk about audacity and innovation so soon after the Nixon landslide. Nixon himself made a shrewd assessment of the popular mood in an interview on the eve of the election. The limousine liberals of the Sixties, he said, threw money at problems to create a permissive, drop-out, addicted and welfare-dependent America. Certainly one of McGovern's problems was that the electorate saw him as a proponent of uncertain change and Nixon as a man of cautious stability.

Serious intellectuals are now giving Nixon's rather crude insight a theoretical form. The government must be very careful about intervening in society, we are told, lest it disturb a delicate organic balance and thereby create more problems than it solves.

But in truth Nixon and the deradicalized intellectuals rest their case upon a fantasy. The Sixties did not "throw money" at problems—nor innovate recklessly. In his *Politics of the Guanranteed Annual Income,* a book which in other respects lionizes Nixon, Daniel Patrick Moynihan writes shrewdly of the Sixties: "The social reforms of the mid-decade had been oversold, and, with the coming of the war, *underfinanced to the degree that seeming failure could be ascribed almost to intent.*"

The government did indeed talk as if it had embarked upon daring undertakings but, with the exception of the Vietnam tragedy, no great departure took place. The New Towns In Town program (supposed to use surplus Federal land for housing in the central cities) was, Moynihan notes, trumpeted by the White House in 1967. Four years later it had resulted in the construction of fewer than 300 units! Where a quantum leap did take place in spending, it occurred in programs—like Medicare and increased social security benefits — which are enormously popular and thereby "safe."

Conventional Wisdom

So the new conventional wisdom has to be turned upside down. The Sixties failed because they did so little. All the money spent on job training was vitiated because, even with the real accomplishments of Kennedy and Johnson, work was not provided for everyone who wanted it. If we had guaranteed the right to work to every citizen, we would not have had to worry so much about the "limits of social policy."

It was a merit of the McGovern campaign that it placed the issue of income distribution on the national agenda and attacked the privileges of unearned income. Cynics say that was a mere summer storm. We disagree. The outrageous maldistribution of wealth in America is not simply unjust in and of itself. It is also a prime source of the skewing of our semi-affluence, which provides billions in discreet subsidy to the rich in suburbia while the central cities are left to rot.

It is necessary to look beyond the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier and the Great Society. We know that Keynesian policies can pump-prime an underutilized economy. But can we assume that if only Washington will get things moving, then the private market provides the best mechanism for a social allocation of the Gross National Product? We think not. We think that liberals must now discuss going beyond liberalism.

Vietnam reinforces that point. That horror cannot be explained by a neo-Leninist theory in which the exigencies of the domestic economy predestined this nation to a bloody policy which, among other things, subverted the greatest opportunity for reform in a generation. Yet it is true that America is a status quo power, and that it therefore has a strong tendency to support reactionary militarists, thereby driving national liberation movements to the Communists.

But what of alternatives for the people of the Third World? Once this nation talked of Point Four and then of the Alliance for Progress. There was much that was wrong with these programs—above all their premise that a capitalist revolution is the way out for Asia, Africa and Latin America—and one thing that was quite right: the understanding that this country must provide democratic alternatives to underdevelopment.

The crying necessity for democratic Left programs and ideas is, then, clear enough. But what about democratic Left politics?

In 1968, the Center-Right of Nixon and Wallace received almost 58% of the votes; in 1972, in a two-way race, Nixon got over 61%. In 1968, the American unions were a major, and sometimes sole, force behind Hubert Humphrey, proving that the organized workers are the most cohesive element that can be mobilized for social change. But the '68 election also proved that labor by itself cannot come close to winning. In 1972, the new politics constituency of the college-educated and issue-oriented proved strong enough to win the Democratic nomination, but not at all strong enough to carry the nation. In 1968 many McCarthyites did not understand that Humphrey was infinitely preferable to Nixon; in 1972, the Meanyites did not understand that McGovern was infinitely preferable to Nixon.

If this split continues, the Republicans will hold the Presidency for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the only way to build a new majority for social change is for labor and the new politics to come together. With the ending of the Vietnam war, it should be possible to focus on what could unite them: full employment, including full economic and social rights for the minorities; the Kennedy-Griffiths health insurance bill; a guaranteed annual income, etc.

The *Newsletter of the Democratic Left* is committed to build such a majority around a democratic Left program. Its initiators are democratic socialists who seek the collaboration of liberals and men and women of good will in this undertaking.

We believe that the left wing of realism is today found in the Democratic Party. It is there that the mass forces for social change are assembled; it is there that the possibility exists for creating a new first party in America.

However, we do not equate our wholehearted struggle

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Reform Begins in the Democratic Party

by Hugh Cleland

The Democratic Party is changing. The "McGovern Reforms" have opened the Party to young people, blacks, women, working people, in unprecedented fashion. Power relationships will never be the same. Neither will the Party long remain as it is today.

At the forthcoming policy-making convention, planned for 1974, groups within the Party will propose their formulae for restructuring it. Will it become a membership party? Will trade unions be given bloc votes, on the British model?

This article is the first of a series on the changing Democratic Party. It will deal with the so-called "McGovern Reforms"—by which we mean changes in party *structure* between 1968 and 1972, and not the 1972 campaign.

"What I have seen throughout my adult life," states Larry O'Brien, "is the deterioration of party organization at all levels. But what I see through reform is the rebirth of party organization. Parties inevitably reach a point where massive reform is necessary for political survival. Almost always they have chosen to die. We have chosen to live."

The bedrock of the Party used to be the "Solid South." In the North, its strength lay primarily with workingclass immigrants, mostly Catholic, whose loyalties were to the parish or the local political machine. In the leadership were a number of big businessmen.

By now the big city machines have all but disappeared, replaced by the New Deal welfare state and by the spread of civil service. "Macing" of public employees—forcing contributions for a political party—once common, is now illegal and seldom practiced. Patronage jobs are fewer. Most of the reasons that used to motivate people to work for a political party are now gone.

There are, of course, still Democratic organizations. Some patronage remains for lawyers who deal with government or aspire to office; real estate firms with an interest in zoning; the economic complex concerned with highway construction; the defense industry. And there are, of course, public spirited officials and members. But this more narrowly based party apparatus is under challenge from reform clubs and issue-oriented groups like ADA, SANE, and Common Cause.

In the days of city and state bosses, the official state organizations kept reformers or factions from getting nominated or gaining control. They did this through obscure rules, red tape, plain secretiveness, sometimes strong-arm tactics. It was because of this tangle of arbitrary rules that socialists and trade unionists despaired of influencing the Democratic Party.

But now the reforms strike at the heart of the mechanism whereby the regular organizations kept control of the party. The reforms were accepted between 1968 and 1972 because so few were left to oppose them.

Up from 1968

The 1968 Convention chose to consider party organiza- for two reasons. One: the decline of the apparatus. The other: bitter complaints of Southern blacks, peace activists and reformers that their influence was blunted by archaic rules. To head off a threatened defection of millions of Democrats, the convention which nominated Hubert Humphrey instructed the incoming national committee to appoint two 28-member commissions. One, on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, was chaired by McGovern and then by Rep. Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota. The second, the Commission on Rules, was chaired by Rep. James O'Hara of Michigan.

The recommendations of these commissions had to be approved by the Democratic National Committee, dominated by Humphrey supporters. So the reforms were the product not simply of the McGovern wing, but of virtually the whole party.

Let's first look at the 1968 Convention. Over one third of the delegates had already been chosen in the previous year, 1967! By the time Johnson decided not to run, all but 12 states had been through the process of selecting delegates. Many states had expensive filing fees; in Connecticut the fee for entering a slate was $14,000. In some states, the state committee selected the delegates. In others, there was a non-publicized public meeting to choose delegates. The delegates to the 1968 convention were 13% women, 5.5% black, and 4% under thirty. *Only 4% were union members.*

The guidelines adopted by the McGovern Commission and approved by the National Committee required that delegates be chosen either in primaries or in open and well-publicized caucuses held in the same year as the convention. Proxy votes were outlawed. Filing fees could be no more than $10, and petitions to get on the ballot required the signature of only one per cent of the Democratic voters. Delegations were required to be *broadly representative* of the state population in terms of age, sex, and race. The guidelines do *not*—repeat, do not—provide for numerical quotas. They simply state that "affirmative steps" must be taken by state parties to encourage the participation of blacks, Spanish-speaking citizens, youth, and women, and that the composition of delegations should be in "reasonable proportion" to the composition of the population of the state.

"Affirmative steps" and "resonable proportion" are not defined. The credentials committee and ultimately the convention is judge of the fairness of representation.

Organized labor had the opportunity to request guidelines for blue collar workers on the delegations, but decided not to do so. The same was true of ethnic groups. Such provisions could still be added to the guidelines.

At first, Senator Hughes of Iowa expected great resistance from the state organizations. He hoped that perhaps ten states would comply. To his amazement, all of them eventually did, and with almost no protests. This is an important index to the decline of the "regulars."

The formal rules of convention procedure recommended by the O'Hara Commission and approved by the National Committee are the first the Democratic Party has ever had; previously the complicated rules of the House of Representatives were used. Under the new rules, due process is provided in challenging delegate seating. Documents containing the grounds for the challenge must be filed well be-

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The Vietnam Struggle

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of the old liberal coalition can be recemented? I doubt that.

First, there will be the need to maintain political vigilance in regard to the Nixon administration—which over and over again, but especially during the horrible bombings of North Vietnam last Christmas, showed its moral sleaziness. If things go badly for Thieu, a strong faction in the Pentagon and the White House can be expected to urge—not a new intervention on the ground—but a resumption of massive bombing. To make sure that doesn't happen, the anti-war forces have to remain alert, in a state of readiness.

Second, there will continue—and indeed, *should* continue—the political-intellectual debate as to the meaning of Vietnam. I detect a tendency among some commentators, notably James Reston in his Sunday-sermon phase, to declare Vietnam "a tragedy" and let it go. That tendency should be resisted, for simply to say it was a tragedy is to smarm over the issues, to avoid a confrontation of ideas by means of a high-sounding phrase. Tragedy; but also a failure of politics, reactionary choices, immoral methods.

Some will say, especially if the Communists take over all of Vietnam, that the mistake we made was not to bomb Hanoi off the map; we can expect a right-wing reaction, though how strong no one knows. Others will find in Vietnam "proof" of the authoritarian idea that the third world must take the route of Communist dictatorship in order to modernize. Both of these views must be fought against in the coming full-scale debate on Vietnam.

In practical politics, one can hope that by 1976 the issue of Vietnam will no longer bedevil the liberal-left and it will be possible for unionists, intellectuals, blacks to unite behind a single candidate, for the first time in several elections. But it would also be naive to think that even in day-to-day politics Vietnam can now, by an act of will, be removed as an important factor. New problems will arise in regard to Vietnam, and they will create new divisions. Old problems will fester, and old disputes too.

Gradually it may be possible to keep the intellectual discussion apart from daily politics, so that people continuing to debate in the former can find limited agreement in the latter. But Vietnam has sunk too deeply into our consciousness for a quick or easy resolution. And perhaps, if we are to learn anything from this national disaster, we should not be in too great a hurry to end the discussion of its meaning.

Irving Howe

Left Wing of Realism

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for immediate reform with our vision of a new society. Neither do we propose to celebrate ceremonial socialism at occasional banquets. Our hopes for the Twenty First century will inspire the actions we take and the programs we urge in 1974 and 1976. Thus, we regard the Kennedy-Griffiths health bill as a gigantic step forward—but only a first step toward the goal of free medical service for all. In being precise about that ideal we can better design what is possible here and now, seeking, for instance, to finance medical care from income tax revenue, the most progressive source of funds in the society.

This socialist inspiration will also inform our attitude toward the American labor movement. We are avowed partisans of the working class in this country and throughout the world (including the Communist nations where workers struggle for socialism against a totalitarian bureaucracy). But that does not mean a *carte blanche* for established union leaders. We think, for example, that the Miners for Democracy made an enormous contribution to unionism by throwing out a corrupt leadership. We want to be honest champions of labor, not sycophants.

Nor do we think that an identification with working people requires us to turn our back on the new forces which emerged in the McCarthy and Kennedy movements of 1968 and in the McGovern campaign of 1972. There are huge changes transforming the American class structure, including mass higher education and the growth of the professional and technical occupations. The new constituency which these trends is beginning to produce has tendencies toward a self-righteous elitism—but also tendencies toward a vision of social justice and an alliance with the unions. We care passionately as to which of these tendencies prevails. We do not want to purge the New Politics from the Democratic Party; we choose, rather, to help bring out its best potential.

The Nixon era could end in 1976. But that can come to pass only if there is a united political movement of the American liberal-left.

Capitalist of the Month

INDIAN PALMS, Calif.—In the thirties, forties and fifties, decisions that shaped much of corporate America were made in the Olympic-size pool in the front of the big house of the Cochran-Odlum ranch here. Bathing trunks were *de rigueur* when Floyd D. Odlum conducted board meetings—and many directors were asked for their vote as they were treading water, a secretary at poolside taking minutes.

"Things to me, have just gone to hell," Mr. Odlum declared. "The whole temperament and attitude of the financial and economic life of America changed with the Depression and the New Deal. People got scared and began looking for security.

"Then the five-day week—not a desirable thing if it results in inflation. What are you going to do with the extra two days? Just get into trouble. People are not trained for leisure." —from the *New York Times*

With the Insurgent Miners in Pennsylvania

by Ray Rogers

On November 10th, I arrived in Shenandoah, Pa., to help manage the insurgent Miners for Miller headquarters in the anthracite region of eastern Pa.

I was assigned to set up and oversee a telephone-mailing operation similar to those employed in Congressional campaigns.

We had five WATS lines covering eastern Pennsylvania installed; with a telephone staff of nine women and one man we kept the phone bank operating almost seven days a week, twelve hours a day. We sent out 20,000 pieces of mail, including one mass mailing to all active and pensioner miners in Pennsylvania. Volunteers, mostly miners and their families, worked endless hours addressing, sorting, and stuffing envelopes.

Once this operation was well in hand, I started working for Miller out in front of elections halls.

Our headquarters felt it important to have as many Miller backers as possible near the halls to assure a fair election, and to forestall any intimidation by Boyle's representatives. As the election progressed, we had no anxiety that it would be other than secret and fair *within* the election halls. Officials from the Department of Labor did a good job in supervising the voting in an impartial manner.

Outside the first election hall I covered, ten Boyle men were surrounding prospective voters. I began to approach each miner, introduced myself as a Miller representative, and said: "I'd like to assure you this election is by secret ballot. It is being run by federal officials just like a Congressional or Presidential election. Only you will know how you vote. If you would like to vote for the entire Miller slate, check the ballot here. Arnold Miller says, honest administration of union funds should enable all pensioners to receive $200 a month (retired anthracite miners were only getting $30 a month). Boyle represents himself and the coal operators; Miller represents the rank and file."

My spiel upset the Boyle people. First, they converged upon me, trying to scare me, calling me names and warning me to watch out. When this proved fruitless, they pretended friendliness; and then they reverted to their attempts at intimidation.

As each voter approached the election hall, I found myself elbow to elbow with Boyle's men. In an effort to discredit me, Boyle's agents shouted to the approaching miners: "Ask the college boy how many years he's worked in the mines?" I replied, "The issue is not how many years I have worked in the mines, since I'm not running for UMW president; the issue is, how many years has Tony Boyle worked in the mines? None! Arnold Miller has, Mike Trbovich has, Harry Patrick has."

They changed their question to: "Ask the college boy how much money he's making out here?" I replied, "None, but that's not the issue. The real issue is Tony Boyle's $50,000 a year salary. And why has $86 million of the miners' money been tied up in non-interest bearing accounts? What about the $40,000 a year Boyle's daughter is getting to be legal counsel for 350 miners in Montana?"

During the eight day election, a large number of miners and college volunteers played a vital role. It paid off, as the anthracite region turned out the heaviest percentage of eligible voters (70%), and also the highest ratio of favorable voters for the Miller slate in the country (5:1). The vast majority of the voters in the anthracite region were elderly and disabled, many suffering from black lung. Some had received phone calls telling them to "watch out how you vote." But these men fought off the bad weather, their disabilities and fears to support Miller. Time and again the men approached the hall shaking the hands of Boyle's reps, but giving a wink to a Miller supporter which signified, "keep it to yourself son, but you got my vote."

It now seems clear than many miners had opposed the Boyle administration, but had feared to challenge it until the Department of Labor and union democracy advocates like Joe Rauh and Herman Benson intervened.

The impact of Miller's election could be profound. A progressive miners union could break the "colonial" hold coal operators now have on Appalachia. Miller's success in mounting a rank-and-file challenge to an autocratic union leadership may serve as an inspiration to other dissatisfied rank-and-filers. It was a fine victory and brought some fresh air to American unionism.

Editorial note: Since Miller's election, he has succeeded in gaining control of the union apparatus, starting to fulfill his promises by cutting officials' bloated salaries and pensions. Miller has called for elections in the Spring to constitute a new Executive Council.

Reform Begins in the Democratic Party

(Continued from page 6)

fore the convention opens. Machinery is provided for open hearings before a hearing officer, who is to be impartial and trained in law.

Key committees of the party and convention have been democratized in accordance with the principle "one Democrat, one vote." Previously, the National Credentials, Rules and Platform Committees had been made up of two delegates from each state, giving Nevada as much power as New York. Now the committees have been enlarged so that larger states are represented according to their population. The committees meet and hold hearings in Washington well before the convention begins.

The reports of the platform and rules committees must be in the delegates' hands ten days before the convention meets, and the credentials report two days before opening. All committee deliberations are open to the public and press. Ten per cent of the members of any committee may file a minority report, which goes to the convention floor for a vote, along with the majority report.

Compare the reformed Democratic Party with the Republican Party as it emerged from its 1972 convention. The Republican Party in 1976 (as in 1972) will distribute convention seats among the states by a complicated formula favoring those with small populations (generally conservative, Southern, and Western states). A delegate from Alaska will represent 25,000 Republicans while a delegate from New York will represent 250,000. Without "guidelines" on representation, the 1972 Republican Convention had 46 black delegates out of 1346.